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GENDER AND NEGOTIATION PERFORMANCE
By Charles B. Craver*
Generally, men are described by a series of traits that reflect competence,
rationality, and assertiveness. Men, for example, are viewed as independent,
objective, active, competitive, adventurous, self-confident, and ambitious.
Women are seen as possessing the opposite of each of these traits. They are
characterized as dependent, subjective, passive, not competitive, not
adventurous, not self-confident, and not ambitious. (Deaux, 1976, at 13)
INTRODUCTION
When men and women negotiate with people of the opposite gender – and even the same
gender – stereotypical beliefs influence their interactions. Many men and women assume that
males are more likely to be highly competitive, manipulative, win-lose negotiators who want to
defeat their opponents. Females are expected to be more accommodating, win-win negotiators
who seek to preserve existing relationships by maximizing the joint return achieved by
negotiating parties. If these stereotypical assumptions are correct, we might reasonably expect
male lawyers and business persons to achieve better results when they negotiate than female
attorneys and business persons.
This article will examine data from the Legal Negotiation course I have taught at George
Washington University over the past sixteen years to determine whether male students obtain
results on class negotiation exercises that differ from the results achieved by female students on
the identical exercises. Before we evaluate my course data, however, I will explore real and
perceived gender-based differences and explain how those differences might affect negotiation
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exercise performance. I will then explain my course methodology and statistical findings.
REAL AND PERCEIVED GENDER-BASED DIFFERENCES
Many persons think that men and women behave in stereotypically different ways when
the interact (Burrell, et al., 1988, at 453). Various traits are attributed to males, while other
characteristics are attributed to females. While some of these gender-based beliefs may reflect
real – i.e., empirically established – behavioral traits, others have no scientifically established
bases. Whether or not these distinctions are real or imagined, they may influence the way men
and women interact when they negotiate, because the participants expect these factors to affect
their dealings.
Men are thought to be rational and logical, while women are considered emotional and
intuitive (Deaux, 1976, at 13). Men are expected to emphasize objective fact, while women focus
more on the maintenance of relationships (Gilligan, 1982). As a result, men are expected to
define issues in abstract terms and try to resolve them through the application of abstract
reasoning (Project, 1988, at 1227).
Men are expected to be dominant and authoritative, while women are supposed to be
passive and submissive ( Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974, at 228, 234). When men and women interact,
males tend to speak for longer periods of time and to interrupt more often than women (Project,
1988, at 1220; Tannen, 1994, at 53-77). Men usually exert more influence over the topics being
discussed. They employ more direct language, while women tend to exhibit tentative and
deferential speech patterns (Smith-Lovin & Robinson, 1992, at 124-26). This male tendency to
dominate male-female interactions could provide men with an advantage during bargaining
encounters, by allowing them to control the agenda and direct the substantive discussions.
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During personal interactions, men are more likely than women to employ “highly
intensive language” to persuade others, and they tend to be more effective using this approach
(Burgoon, et al., 1983, at 284, 292). Women, on the other hand, are more likely to use less
intense language during persuasive encounters, and they are inclined to be more effective
behaving this way. Females tend to employ language containing more disclaimers (“I think”;
“you know”) than their male cohorts (Smeltzer & Watson, 1986, at 78), which may cause women
to be perceived as less forceful.
Formal education diminishes the presence of gender-based communication differences
(Burrell, et al., 1988, at 453). This factor explains why male and female lawyers tend to employ
similar language when they endeavor to persuade others. Nonetheless, even when women use the
same language as men, they may be perceived as being less persuasive (Burrell, et al., 1988, at
463). This gender-based factor is counterbalanced, however, by the fact that women continue to
be more sensitive to nonverbal signals than their male cohorts (Hall, 1984, at 15-17).
Gender-based stereotypes cause many people difficulty when they interact with attorneys
and business people of the opposite gender (Kolb & Williams, 2000; Kolb, 2000). Men often
expect women to behave like “ladies” during their negotiation interactions. Overt aggressiveness
that would be considered vigorous advocacy if employed by men may be characterized as
offensive and threatening when used by women. This is especially true when females employ
foul language and loud voices. Male negotiators who would immediately counter these tactics by
other men with quid pro quo responses frequently find it difficult to adopt retaliatory approaches
against “ladies.” When men permit such an irrelevant factor to influence and restrict their use of
responsive tactics, they provide their female opponents with an inherent bargaining advantage.
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Some men also find it difficult to act as competitively against female opponents as they would
against male opponents. Male negotiators who are afraid to behave as competitively toward
female opponents as they would against male adversaries give further leverage to their female
opponents.

Despite their hesitancy to behave as competitively toward female opponents as they
would toward male adversaries, I have noticed an interesting phenomenon that might affect malefemale interactions in my Legal Negotiation class. A number of men have privately expressed a
fear of losing to female opponents. As a result, several have indicated that they would prefer the
negative consequences associated with non-settlements than risk the embarrassment of being
defeated by women. While this factor could increase the probability of non-settlements when
men and women interact, it should not affect comparative negotiation results since both male and
female participants would be equally disadvantaged by the resulting non-settlements.
Male attorneys and business people occasionally make the mistake of assuming that their
female opponents will not engage in as many negotiating “games” as their male adversaries.
Even many women erroneously assume that other females are unlikely to employ the
Machiavellian tactics stereotypically associated with members of the competitive male culture.
Men and women who expect their female adversaries to behave less competitively and more
cooperatively often ignore the realities of their negotiation encounters and give a significant
bargaining advantage to women who are actually willing to employ manipulative tactics.
Some male negotiators attempt to obtain a psychological advantage against aggressive
female bargainers by casting aspersions on the femininity of those individuals. They hope to
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embarrass those participants and make them feel self-conscious with respect to the approach they
are using. Female negotiators should never allow adversaries to employ this tactic. They have the
right to use any techniques they think appropriate, regardless of the stereotypes those tactics may
contradict. To male opponents who raise specious objections to their otherwise proper conduct,
they should reply that they do not wish to be viewed as “ladies,” but merely as participants in
bargaining encounters in which their gender should be irrelevant.
Female negotiators who discover that gender-based stereotypes are negatively affecting
their bargaining interactions may wish to directly raise the issue to diminish the impact of
negative stereotyping (Schneider, 1994, at 112-13). They may ask opponents if they find it
difficult to negotiate against female adversaries. While most male opponents will immediately
deny any such beliefs, they are likely to internally reevaluate their treatment of female opponents.
Once both parties acknowledge, internally or externally, the possible impact of stereotypical
beleifs, they can try to avoid group generalizations and focus on the particular individuals with
whom they must currently interact.
Empirical studies indicate that men and women do not behave identically in competitive
situations. Females tend to be initially more trusting and trustworthy than their male cohorts, but
they are usually less willing to forgive violations of their trust than are men (Rubin & Brown,
1975, at 171-73). People interacting with female negotiators who exhibit verbal and nonverbal
signals consistent with such female expectations may be able to establish trusting and
cooperative relationships with them so long as they do not engage in conduct of an untrusting
nature.
When men and women interact in different settings, they both engage in some untruthful
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behavior. Males tend to lie on a self-oriented basis to enhance their own images (“braggadocio”),
while women tend to engage in other-oriented deception intended to make others feel better (“I
love that new outfit”; “you made a great presentation”) (DePaulo, et al., 1996, at 986-87). This
difference would probably cause males to feel more comfortable than women when they employ
deceptive behavior during bargaining encounters to advance their own interests, because such
conduct would be of a self-oriented nature.
One observer has suggested that “women are more likely [than men] to avoid competitive
wishes, and not likely to do as well in competition.” (Stiver, 1983, at 5) Many women are
apprehensive regarding the negative consequences they associate with competitive achievement,
fearing that competitive success will alienate them from others (Gilligan, 1982, at 14-15). Males
in my Legal Negotiation course tend to be more accepting of extreme results obtained by other
men than by such results achieved by women. Even female students tend to be more critical of
women who attain exceptional results than they are of men who do so.
Males tend to exude more confidence than women in performance-oriented settings. Even
when minimally prepared, men think they can “wing it” and get through successfully (Goleman,
1998, at 7). On the other hand, no matter how thoroughly prepared women are, they tend to feel
unprepared (Evans, 2000, at 84-85; McIntosh, 1985). I have often observed this difference among
my Legal Negotiation students. Successful males think they can achieve beneficial results in
future settings, while successful females continue to express doubts about their own capabilities.
I find this frustrating, because the accomplished women are as proficient as their accomplished
male cohorts.
Male and female self-confidence is influenced by the stereotypical ways in which others
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evaluate their performances. Men who perform masculine tasks no more proficiently than women
tend to be given higher evaluations than their equally performing female cohorts (Foschi, 1991,
at 185). When men are successful, their performance tends to be attributed to intrinsic factors
such as hard work and intellignece; when women are successful, their performance is likely to be
attributed to extrinsic factors such as luck or the assistance of others (Deaux, 1976, at 30-32).
This phenomenon enhances male self-confidence by enabling them to receive credit for their
accomplishments, while it undermines the self-confidence of successful women by diminishing
the personal credit they deserve for their efforts.
Men and women often differ with respect to their view of appropriate bargaining
outcomes. Women tend to believe in “equal” exchanges, while men tend to expect “equitable”
distributions (Lewicki, et al., 1994, at 330). These predispositions may induce female negotiators
to accept equal results despite their possession of greater bargaining strength, while male
bargainers seek equitable exchanges that reflect relevant power imbalances.
Gender-based competitive differences may be attributable to the different acculturation
process for boys and girls (Menkel-Meadow, 2000, at 362-64). Parents tend to be more protective
of their daughters than their sons (Marone, 1992, at 42-45). Most boys are exposed to
competitive situations at an early age (Evans, 2000, at 12-13; Tannen, 1990, at 43-47). They have
been encouraged to participate in little league baseball, basketball, football, soccer, and other
competitive athletic endeavors. These activities introduce boys to the “thrill of victory and the
agony of defeat” during their formative years (Harragan, 1977, at 75-78). “Traditional girls’
games like jump rope and hopscotch are turn-taking games, where competition is indirect since
one person’s success does not necessarily signify another’s failure.” (Gilligan, 1982, at 10). By
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adulthood, men are more likely to have become accustomed to the rigors of overt competition
than women. While it is true that little league and interscholastic sports for women have become
more competitive in recent years, most continue to be less overtly competitive than
corresponding male athletic endeavors (Evans, 2000, at 80).

LEGAL NEGOTIATION COURSE METHODOLOGY
Since 1986, I have regularly taught a Legal Negotiation course at George Washington
University. During the first half of the semester, the class explores theoretical and practical
concepts pertaining to the negotiation process. Students are assigned chapters from my book
(Craver, 2001). The impact of verbal and nonverbal communication and such psychological
factors as anchoring, gain-loss framing, and commitment escalation upon the negotiation process
is studied. The cooperative/problem-solving and competitive/adversarial bargaining styles are
evaluated. The manner in which the personal needs of the clients and attorneys and the different
types of legal problems and relationships involved affects bargaining encounters is considered.
The various stages of the negotiation process (preparation, preliminary, information, distributive,
closing , and cooperative) are examined, along with the different techniques negotiators are likely
to encounter. The way in which cultural differences and gender role expectations affect
bargaining interactions is also contemplated. Specific issues pertaining to such topics as
telephone negotiations, the enhancement of weaker positions, and the use of mediation to assist
negotiating parties are explored.
While the negotiation process is being formally explored, the students are required to
engage in three or four negotiation exercises. Class members are divided into groups of two or
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four. The groups are each instructed to negotiate the resolution of the identical legal problem. At
the conclusion of each exercise, the various results are disclosed and individual negotiations are
evaluated to determine which techniques were successfully and unsuccessfully employed. I try to
integrate the theoretical concepts with the students’ simulated exercises. The results of these
practice negotiations do not affect student grades.
During the second half of the semester, class members engage in five negotiation
exercises that count towards two-thirds of course grades. One or two are distributive exercises
that only involve the payment and receipt of money, while the others are multiple-item exercises
that are intended to encourage cooperative bargaining designed to maximize the joint return
achieved by the negotiating parties.
Each problem is structured in a duplicate bridge format. Everyone receives the same
“General Information” describing the specific issues that have to be resolved. All of the
individuals on the same side are provided with the identical “Confidential Information” apprising
them of their client’s goals and the manner in which they will be evaluated if they achieve a
settlement or fail to do so. The less complicated exercises are conducted on a one-on-one basis,
while the more complicated exercises are done on a two-on-two basis. I give the students
partners for the more complex exercises to assist them with the more complicated issues and
scoring information, and to demonstrate the fact the lawyers not only negotiate with opponents
but also with their own clients. For each exercise, participants are assigned different opponents
(and different partners where relevant).
The results of each exercise are rank-ordered from high to law for each side based on the
team’s results measured against the confidential scoring information provided prior to the
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exercise. This ordering scheme is used to grade each team’s performance. If there are ten groups
of four, the highest group on each side receives ten placement points, the next highest group nine,
and so forth. If there are twenty groups of two, the highest person on each side receives ten
placement points, the second highest 9.5, the third highest nine, etc. The half-steps are used for
the one-on-one exercises to be sure they are given placement points comparable to those given
the two-on-two exercises. Students are also required to prepare ten to fifteen page papers
analyzing their negotiation experiences based on the concepts explored throughout the term. This
paper accounts for one-third of course grades.
The environment in my Legal Negotiation course is quite competitive. Each group is
evaluated solely by its performance vis-a-vis the other groups representing the same side of the
problem. Although opposing parties are encouraged to maximize their joint return through
cooperative bargaining, students realize that it is their own respective point totals that will
determine their group placement and, ultimately, their individual grades. This direct impact on
their course grades causes the students to take the exercises seriously.
STATISTICAL RESULTS
Since I have not observed any differences in the negotiation results achieved by male and
female students, my Null Hypothesis is that there is no difference between men and women with
respect to performance on the negotiation exercises. My Alternative Hypothesis is that there is a
gender-based difference between men and women with respect to performance on the negotiation
exercises. My database included negotiation results from sixteen Legal Negotiation classes at
George Washington University. Because I was only comparing male and female negotiation
achievement, only the student negotiation scores were used. I did not consider the scores earned
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by students on their course papers. The mean negotiation scores were calculated for males and
females in each of the sixteen classes. A t-test was then performed for each class to determine if
there was a statistically significant difference between the male and female means for any class.
T-test probability values of 0.10 or lower would establish statistical significance at the 0.10 level,
while t-test probability values of 0.05 or lower would demonstrate significance at the 0.05 level
(Barnes & Conley, 1986, at 306-08). Since I hypothesized that no statistically significant
differences would be found and had no reason to suspect that if any difference was found it
would favor males or females, two-tailed t-test probability values were calculated. The relevant
data are set forth in Table 1.
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Table 1
T-Test Comparisons of Gender-Based Means

Year

N

Male
Negot.
Mean

Female
Negot.
Mean

Difference
in
Means

p-value

1986

45

29.67

30.39

-0.71

.76

1988

55

38.67

38.79

-0.12

.96

1989

58

41.23

40.40

0.83

.77

1990

58

42.30

37.96

4.33

.14

1991

61

41.29

39.90

1.39

.61

1992

48

35.15

37.64

-2.49

.37

1992.5

59

40.15

40.32

-0.17

.95

1993

59

39.85

40.52

-0.67

.84

1994

62

40.75

37.50

3.26

.31

1995

56

32.23

26.14

6.09

.01

1996

51

34.53

36.47

-1.94

.49

1997

40

28.14

25.37

2.77

.19

1998

46

34.64

31.60

3.04

.19

1999

48

32.26

30.77

1.49

.60

2000

41

28.09

25.57

2.52

.31

2001

35

24.67

26.19

-1.52

.52

13
A review of the data set forth in Table 1 suggests the absence of any correlation between
gender and negotiation performance. For only a single year (1995) was a statistically significant
correlation discerned. For the other fifteen years, not a single statistically significant correlation
was obtained at even the 0.10 level. For nine of the sixteen years (1989, 1990, 1991, 1994, 1995,
1997, 1998, 1999 & 2000) the male mean was slightly higher than the female mean, while for the
other seven years (1986, 1988, 1992, 1992.5, 1993, 1996 & 2001) the female mean was slightly
higher than the male mean. These findings clearly support acceptance of the Null Hypothesis
suggesting the absence of any statistically significant correlation between gender and negotiation
performance.
FINDING IMPLICATIONS
Over the past sixteen years, I have discovered that both practicing attorneys and law
students of both genders permit gender-based stereotypes to influence their negotiating
interactions with persons of the opposite gender – and even people of the same gender. Many
individuals assume that men are highly competitive and manipulative negotiators who always
seek to obtain maximum results for themselves. Female negotiators, on the other hand, are
expected to be more accommodating and less competitive interactants who try to maximize the
joint return achieved by the parties.
On those occasions in my Legal Negotiation class when two women have been paired
against two other women, they have often allowed stereotypical beliefs to influencey their
interaction. They have regularly expressed the preliminary view that their interaction will be
more pleasant due to the absence of the overt win-lose competitiveness they attribute to their
male cohorts. Once their bargaining encounters have commenced, however, they have generally
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behaved as competitively as their male classmates.
This empirical study was undertaken to test the validity of practicing attorney and student
assumptions regarding the impact of gender upon negotiation performance. Based upon my prior
course observations, I hypothesized that there was no difference with respect to the negotiation
outcomes obtained by male and female bargainers. The sixteen years of data warrant acceptance
of the Null Hypothesis. The t-test calculations disclosed no statistically significant differences
between the mean results obtained by male and female negotiators.
The absence of any statistically significant differences between the results obtained by
male and female students on my Legal Negotiation course exercises should not be surprising.
Law students are a self-selecting group of intelligent and competitive individuals. I would
surmise that similar results would be obtained with respect to negotiation exercise results among
business school students who are also bright and competitive persons. It is thus possible that an
analogous study of the results achieved by undergraduate or high school students on negotiation
exercises might generate some gender-based differences.
It would be beneficial for people who teach clinical negotiation courses in business
schools, undergraduate schools, and high schools to engage in similar empirical studies to
determine whether they would find any statistically significant gender differences. It would also
be informative for teachers of other clinical skills courses, such as trial practice, mediation, and
client counseling, to compare the performances of their students to ascertain the presence or
absence of any gender-based distinctions.
Negotiating teachers should also evaluate our own gender-based beliefs to ensure that we
are not subconsciously encouraging male and female students to behave differently. We should
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be careful not to permit individuals to suggest that female negotiators cannot achieve substantive
results as beneficial as those obtained by their male cohorts. We should also try not to judge male
and female negotiating behavior by different standards based upon the gender of the persons
being evaluated.
Legal practitioners and business firm officials should acknowledge the impact that
gender-based stereotypes may have upon negotiation interactions. Male attorneys who think that
female opponents will not be as competitive or manipulative as their male colleagues will
provide women adversaries with an inherent advantage. They will let their guards down and
behave less competitively against female opponents than they would toward male opponents.
Female negotiators must also reject gender-based stereotypical beliefs with respect to both male
and female opponents. Women who conclude that adversaries are treating them less seriously
because of their gender should not hesitate to take advantage of the situation. The favorable
bargaining outcomes achieved by these women should teach chauvinistic opponents a crucial
lesson.
CONCLUSION
Sixteen years of data have demonstrated the absence of any statistically significant
differences pertaining to the negotiation results achieved by male and female law students. This
finding should cause students, practitioners, and teachers to reassess the validity of their
stereotypical beliefs concerning the behavior of men and women in competitive interactions.
There is no reason to believe that female negotiators cannot obtain outcomes as beneficial as
those obtained by their male counterparts in any bargaining encounter.
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